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We build a model in which ¯nancial intermediaries provide insurance to
households against a liquidity shock. Households can also invest directly on
a ¯nancial market if they pay a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of inter-
mediaries to share risk is constrained by the market. This can be bene¯cial
because intermediaries invest less in the productive technology when they
provide more risk-sharing. Our model predicts that bank-oriented economies
should grow slower than more market-oriented economies, which is consistent
with some recent empirical evidence. We show that the mix of intermediaries
and market that maximizes welfare under a given level of ¯nancial develop-
ment depends on economic fundamentals. We also show the optimal mix of
two structurally very similar economies can be very di®erent.
Keywords: Financial intermediaries; Financial markets; Risk-sharing; Growth
JEL classi¯cation: E44; G10; G20
21 Introduction
An important question related to both growth and ¯nance theory is whether
the ¯nancial system in°uences growth in the long-run. We build a model
in which ¯nancial markets reduce the amount of risk-sharing ¯nancial inter-
mediaries can provide but promote investment in a productive technology.
Hence, in our model, market-oriented ¯nancial systems yield more growth,
but provide less risk-sharing than bank-oriented system. Which system pro-
vides the highest welfare is ambiguous.
We build on a model by Fecht (forthcoming) in which banks play two
di®erent roles: First, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), they provide insur-
ance to consumers against preference shocks. Second, as in Diamond and
Rajan (2000, 2001), the re¯nancing from numerous small depositors enables
banks - in contrast to other ¯nancial institutions - to credibly commit not
to renegotiate on the repayment obligations on deposits, because this would
immediately trigger a run. While banks can e±ciently monitor projects,
households have to pay a cost to do so and become a sophisticated investor.
As shown in Fecht (forthcoming), a trade-o® arises between the ability for
the bank to provide risk-sharing and the number of sophisticated depositors.
We embed the static model into a dynamic overlapping generations struc-
ture, as in Ennis and Keister (2003). In this context a trade-o® between the
amount of risk-sharing provided by banks and growth arises. An increase in
risk-sharing implies less investment in productive assets and less growth, be-
cause a higher degree of risk-sharing goes along with larger liquidity holdings
in any point in time.
While we believe that this trade-o® is important, it should be noted
that our model focuses on the liability-side of banks. Thus, because some
activities on the asset-side of banks may promote growth, our results could
1overstate the growth reducing impact of bank-oriented system.1 Empirical
evidence provided by Beck and Levine (2002) and Levine (2002) suggests
that a more developed ¯nancial system promotes growth. However, they fail
to ¯nd any evidence that the composition of the ¯nancial system, whether
it is bank- or market-based, under a given level of ¯nancial development
in°uences growth. More recently however, Ergungor (2003) shows that, when
the °exibility of the legal system is taken into account, empirical evidence
suggests that market-based ¯nancial systems promote growth in countries
with °exible legal systems compared to bank-based systems.2 The reason
is that activities on the asset-side of banks have less of a growth-enhancing
role in countries with °exible legal systems then in countries with in°exible
legal systems. Hence, it is not surprising that the growth-reducing e®ect of
bank-oriented system that our paper describes should be more apparent in
countries with °exible legal systems.
There is a large literature on the nexus between ¯nancial systems and
economic growth. See Levine (1997) for a review. However, most of this lit-
erature is concerned with the e®ect of ¯nancial development on the e±ciency
of investments; i.e., on capital productivity. Only a limited number of papers
deal with the impact of ¯nancial systems on households' saving decisions{the
portfolio choice between liquidity holdings and long-term investments{and
their e®ect on economic growth. For instance, Jappelli and Pagano (1994)
show that ¯nancial market imperfections may increase the savings rate and
thus growth by limiting households' ability to smooth consumption over the
1Chakraborty and Ray (2003) emphasize the asset-side of banks.
2Countries with °exible legal systems and market-oriented ¯nancial systems include
the US and the UK. Those with bank-oriented ¯nancial system include Belgium, Finland,
and Norway. The extent to which the ¯nancial system is bank-oriented in these countries
is comparable to Germany. Denmark and the Netherland are slightly less bank-oriented.
2life cycle. Thus their ¯ndings are closely related to our results. But in our
model an increasing e±ciency of ¯nancial markets restrains banks in pro-
viding e±cient risk-sharing and thereby increases long-term investment and
growth. Levine (1991) studies the e®ect that the existence of a ¯nancial mar-
ket has on growth in a Diamond-Dybvig setup. He shows that - compared to
a situation in which households are autarkic - the possibility to sell long-term
¯nancial claims in the case of liquidity needs increases households willingness
to invest in these claims ex-ante, increasing investment and growth. Simi-
larly, Bencivenga and Smith (1991) argue that the introduction of a bank
in such an economy has an analogous e®ect on investment and growth. But
these papers do not compare the degree of liquidity insurance provided by the
market with those provided by the bank. Neither do they consider the inter-
action of markets and intermediaries. In our paper, in contrast, we focus on
the interaction between ¯nancial markets and intermediaries. Intermediaries
are shown to promote risk-sharing at the cost of growth, while markets have
the opposite e®ect. Thus we derive the optimal mix of banks and markets.
Our paper is also related to those models that are concerned with the op-
timal degree of bank-dominance at di®erent levels of economic development.
Some such papers argue that developing countries have more bank-oriented
¯nancial systems and that, in the process of development, a gradual evolution
toward a more market-oriented system occurs. The importance of banks in
developing countries can be explained by informational asymmetries. A high
¯xed cost of setting up a well functioning ¯nancial market can help explain
the evolution towards a more market-oriented system over time. For exam-
ple, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) study a model in which growth spurs
the development of ¯nancial intermediaries who, in turn, enhance growth.
See also Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2001). We provide numerical examples
3that suggest our model can account for the transition from a bank-oriented
system to a market-oriented system. Hence, our paper suggests a di®erent
story based on an endogenous trade-o® between risk-sharing and growth.
Our paper is also related to a literature which compares the performance
of markets and intermediaries (see, for example, Antinol¯ and Kawamura
2003, Bhattacharya and Padilla 1996, Chakraborty and Ray 2003, Fulghieri
and Rovelli 1998, or Qian, John, and John 2004). The work which is perhaps
closest in spirit to our paper is that by Allen and Gale (1997). These au-
thors consider an environment in which a ¯nancial intermediary can provide
risk-sharing to overlapping generations of households. However, a ¯nancial
market constrains the ability of intermediaries to provide this risk-sharing.
They show that a system with an intermediary and no market can provide a
Pareto improvement compared to a system in which the market is active.
Our model di®ers from theirs in several respects. For example, we do
not consider intergenerational risk-sharing of shocks to the return of the
production technology. Our model considers a liquidity shock like that in
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Despite these di®erences, our results are very
close to theirs, at least in our static environment. In both their model and
ours a bank-oriented system is preferred because it allows more risk-sharing.
Further, the extent to which banks can provide risk-sharing is limited by the
¯nancial market. However, di®erent conclusions arise when we account for
the trade-o® between risk-sharing and growth in our dynamic model. Allen
and Gale (1997) are unable to study the impact of risk-sharing on growth
because their results depend on the assumption that the productive asset is
in ¯xed supply. In contrast, our setup naturally extends to a dynamic case.
This is related to another contribution of our paper. Many models of ¯-
nancial intermediation have the property that markets constrain the amount
4of risk-sharing intermediaries can o®er. This was pointed out by Jacklin
(1987) about the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. It is also the case in
Allen and Gale (1997) and particularly in Diamond (1997). In these models
¯nancial markets lower social welfare because they prevent intermediaries
from providing as much risk-sharing as they could. Since markets are as-
sumed to provide no alternative bene¯t, there is no trade-o®. In this paper,
in contrast, a meaningful trade-o® occurs since markets promote growth.
Hence markets no longer necessarily reduce welfare.3
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the
static environment. Section 3 embeds the static model of section 2 in an
OLG framework and describes our main results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Static environment
The environment described in this section is similar to the one in Fecht
(forthcoming). The economy takes place at three dates, t = 0;1;2, and is
populated by a mass 1 of households, a large number of banks, and a large
number of entrepreneurs. There is a unique good in the economy and, at
date 0, households are endowed with 1 unit of this good.
Households learn at date t = 1 if they are impatient (with probability q)
or patient (with probability 1¡q). In the former case they only derive utility
3Although we focus on growth in this paper, it might be the case that ¯nancial mar-
kets provide other bene¯ts that can be traded o® against the constraint they impose on
intermediaries. For example, markets o®er a more diverse set of investment opportunities.
Hence, maybe our model should be considered as illustrative of a more fundamental point.
Markets and intermediaries provide di®erent bene¯ts and the optimal mix of those bene¯ts
might depend on parameters of the economy considered. Moreover, as we show in Figure
5, it might be the case that two very di®erent combinations of markets and intermediaries
provide the same welfare.
5from consumption at date 1, and in the later case they only derive utility
from consumption at date 2. Expected utility can be written
U(c1;c2) = qu(c1) + (1 ¡ q)u(c2):
The function u exhibits CRRA: u(c) = c1¡®
1¡®, with ® > 1. Whether a house-
hold is patient or impatient is private information.
There are two production technologies in the economy: A storage tech-
nology, which returns 1 unit of the good at date t + 1 for each unit invested
at date t, t = 0;1, and a productive technology. Both technologies are
available to everyone. The productive technology is operated costlessly by
entrepreneurs who are not endowed with any goods. Entrepreneurs decide
at date 1 either to \behave," in which case the technology has a return of R
at date 2 for each unit invested at date 0, or to \shirk," in which case the
date 2 return is only °R, with R > 1 > °R > 0.
Competition leads entrepreneurs to promise a repayment of R at date 2
for each unit invested at date 0. At date 1 a secondary market is open on
which claims to the return on the productive technology can be exchanged for
goods. In equilibrium, banks will supply on this market the claims demanded
by sophisticated households. At date 2, entrepreneurs pay out the actual
return of the project to the holder of the ¯nancial claim.
Households can either become sophisticated or remain unsophisticated.
Sophisticated households can monitor entrepreneurs perfectly and are able
to replace a misbehaving entrepreneur without foregoing any of the expected
return of the project. Thus, these households can guarantee themselves a
return of R at date 2 if they lend to entrepreneurs. Unsophisticated house-
holds are unable to monitor entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs ¯nanced by such
households will always shirk and their projects will return only °R at date
2. Households choose whether or not to become sophisticated at date 0. To
6become sophisticated, a household must pay a utility cost proportional to its
expected utility, (Â ¡ 1)[qu(c1) + (1 ¡ q)u(c2)], where Â ¸ 1.4
There are several ways to think of this cost. It could represent the cost of
learning to become a ¯nancial analyst or of getting an MBA. Alternatively,
it could be the e®ort spent in order to monitor entrepreneurs. In either case,
the cost could be measured in terms of utility, resources, or both. The size
of Â could be a®ected by the development of ¯nancial markets, or the extent
to which ¯nancial instruments are standardized, among other things. We
consider the cost Â as exogenously determined but discuss, in the conclusion,
some policy implications of our model in the case government policies can
in°uence Â.
Alternatively, households can deposit their endowment in a bank rather
than investing directly in the market. Banks invest the deposits they have
received in storage or in ¯nancial claims on the productive technology. They
can also trade in the secondary ¯nancial market at date 1. Banks can moni-
tor entrepreneurs costlessly and thus guarantee a return of R for the projects
they have invested in.5 Further, as in Diamond and Rajan (2001), banks can
credibly commit to pay this return to a third party by setting up a deposit
contract. Such a contract exposes banks to runs if they attempt to renegoti-
ate the repayments they have promised depositors.6 Thus, one role of banks
in this environment is to intermediate investment for unsophisticated house-
holds and thus allow them to indirectly invest in the productive technology,
4Assuming a proportional cost simpli¯es the analysis when we study a dynamic econ-
omy. However, we expect our results to hold for more general speci¯cations of the cost.
Our results hold also for a proportional resource cost as we show below.
5Our results do not depend on the assumption that the return banks receive from
investing in the long-term technology is the same as the return sophisticated households
get for such investment. We assume these return are equal to simplify the exposition.
6See Diamond and Rajan (2000) for a more complete exposition of this argument.
7as in Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001). Additionally, in this setup banks
can provide liquidity insurance to depositors who do not know whether they
will be patient or impatient, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). However,
if they do so the fragility of deposit ¯nancing that enables banks to e±-
ciently intermediate investment for unsophisticated households brings about
the existence of a second equilibrium. In this run equilibrium all depositors
withdraw their deposits simply because they expect that other depositors
will do the same and the bank will therefore run out of funds. In this paper
we focus on the good equilibrium and do not consider bank runs.7
2.1 Equilibrium allocation
In this section we derive the deposit contract o®ered by banks. At the be-
ginning of date 0, banks choose the deposit contract they o®er households
and households decide whether or not to become sophisticated simultane-
ously.8 Let d1 denote the payment banks promise depositors who withdraw
at date 1, and d2 denote the payment banks promise depositors who with-
draw at date 2. If banks provide any insurance against the liquidity shock,
then R > d2 ¸ d1 > 1. Fecht (forthcoming) shows arbitrage pins the price of
claims on the productive technology in the secondary market at 1 and com-
petitive banks will supply the claims demanded by sophisticated depositors.9
7The e®ect of bank runs on growth is studied in Ennis and Keister (2003).
8If banks are allowed to move ¯rst, they can o®er a contract under which no household
has an incentive to become sophisticated. Our results also hold in this case, as the cost
of becoming sophisticated still in°uences the contract o®ered by banks, but then the
secondary market is inactive.
9 If the price of claims is smaller than 1, then banks invest only in the storage technology
in order to make a pro¯t when they buy claims on the secondary market. The supply of
such claims would thus be zero, implying this cannot be an equilibrium. If the price of
claims is greater than 1, then banks invest only in the productive technology in order to
8Consequently, all households strictly prefer to deposit their endowment in
a bank as long as banks provide some liquidity insurance. Indeed, sophis-
ticated depositors can withdraw d1 at date 1 from the bank. Since d1 > 1
the value of deposits at date 1 is greater than the resale value of claims on
the productive technology on the secondary market open at date 1. Hence,
at that date, sophisticated patient households choose to withdraw their de-
posits from the banks and buy claims on the productive technology in the
secondary market. For unsophisticated households, depositing in a bank is
the only way to bene¯t from the productive technology.
To summarize, at date 1, all impatient households withdraw and con-
sume. Sophisticated patient households withdraw from the bank and invest
on the secondary market since Rd1 ¸ d2, with a strict inequality if banks
provide some liquidity insurance. Banks are unable to prevent sophisticated
households from withdrawing their deposits since a household's type is pri-
vate information. Note that even though banks cannot observe if a particular
depositor is sophisticated or not, they can infer, in equilibrium, the fraction
of sophisticated depositors.
We can now write the problem of a competitive bank. The bank tries to
maximize the utility of its unsophisticated depositors subject to a resource
constraint.10 The bank's objective function is
qu(d1) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2) (1)
make a pro¯t when they sell these claims on the secondary market to obtain goods for
impatient depositors. The supply of goods at date 1 would thus be zero, implying this
cannot be an equilibrium.
10Fecht (forthcoming) shows that there does not exist a separating equilibrium for this
model. A bank trying to maximize the expected utility of sophisticated depositors would
not be able to attract any unsophisticated depositors and hence would not be able to
provide any liquidity insurance. Consequently, competition leads banks to maximize the
expected utility of unsophisticated depositors.
9and the resource constraint is




where i denotes the fraction of unsophisticated depositors. The constraint
says the bank must have enough resources to pay d2 to a fraction 1 ¡ q of
unsophisticated depositors at date 2 and d1 to all sophisticated depositors as
well as a fraction q of unsophisticated depositors at date 1.
Contracts that maximize (1) subject to (2) are characterized by
d1 =
R















Such a contract will be an equilibrium contract only if it satis¯es two incentive
constraints. First, it must be the case °Rd1 · d2, otherwise unsophisticated
depositors would withdraw their deposits to buy ¯nancial claims on the sec-
ondary market. This constraint is always satis¯ed since we assumed 1 > °R.
The second constraint, which we refer to as ICS, is Rd1 ¸ d2. This constraint
guarantees that sophisticated patient households are never strictly better o®
by staying in the bank until date 2. When ICS holds with equality, £ = R,
and sophisticated patient depositors are indi®erent between leaving their de-
posits in the bank and withdrawing them to invest in the secondary market.




®¡1 + (1 ¡ q)
¤¡1 : (6)
ICS binds whenever i · i. If this happens, the contract is given by equations
(3) and (4) with £ = R.
10The equilibrium mass of unsophisticated depositors, i, is determined by
the condition that depositors must be indi®erent between becoming sophis-
ticated or remaining unsophisticated. This condition is
qu(d1) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2) = Â[qu(d1) + (1 ¡ q)u(d1R)]: (7)
We can use equations (3) and (4) to substitute for d1 and d2 in that expres-






(Â ¡ 1): (8)
Using the de¯nition of £, we obtain the following expression for i
i =
(


















It can easily be seen that an increase in Â, the cost of becoming sophisticated,
will lead to an increase in i, the fraction of unsophisticated depositors. As
expected, i = i if there is no cost of becoming sophisticated, or Â = 1. We can
also ¯nd the cost above which no depositor becomes sophisticated, denoted





(1 ¡ q)R1¡® + q
: (10)
If Â ¸ ¹ Â the cost of becoming sophisticated is so high that no depositors
chooses to become sophisticated.
We can derive the amount of investment in the productive technology
chosen by banks and denoted by K. Part of the investment, (1 ¡ q)i(d2=R),
is needed to provide consumption for unsophisticated patient depositors who
withdraw at date 2. The rest, (1¡q)(1¡i)d1 is sold to patient sophisticated
depositors on the secondary market. The expression for K is thus
K(i) = 1 ¡
q
1 ¡ (1 ¡ q)i(1 ¡ £
R)
: (11)
11It is decreasing in i. In particular, K(i = i) = 1 ¡ q and
K(i = 1) = 1 ¡
q




The above model gives us a way to think about ¯nancial systems being
more bank-based or more market-oriented. When the cost of becoming so-
phisticated is high, there are few such depositors (i is large) and the secondary
market for ¯nancial claims is not very active. Banks are able to o®er a lot
of liquidity insurance but there is relatively little investment in the produc-
tive technology. Conversely, when the cost of becoming sophisticated is low,
there are many such depositors (i is small) and the secondary market is very
active. Banks o®er little liquidity insurance, or none at all, but there is more
aggregate investment in the productive technology. Hence, when comparing
two economies, A and B, with a di®erent fraction of sophisticated depositors,
iA > iB, we say economy A is more bank oriented or, equivalently, economy
B is more market oriented.
The model does not provide an obvious way to compare di®erent levels
of ¯nancial development. Hence, when comparing two economies, we are
implicitly assuming that the level of ¯nancial development in both economies
is the same. Also, banks do not play a special role in enforcing contracts in
this paper.12 Since the model does not emphasize the asset-side of banks,
it is more likely to apply to countries that have a °exible legal system as
de¯ned by Ergungor (2003).
11Alternatively, the level of investment in the long term technology can be derived by
considering what is not consumed at date 1; i.e., K = 1 ¡ qd1.
12See Chakraborty and Ray (2003) for a model where banks play a role in enforcing
contracts.
122.2 The resource-cost case
In this setup, a young household that decides to become sophisticated at the
beginning of period t will incur a (1 ¡ C) percent consumption loss at the
end of period t or the beginning of period t + 1, for some C · 1.13 In this
case, equation (7) becomes
qu(d1) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2) = [qu(Cd1) + (1 ¡ q)u(Cd1R)]: (13)
We can use equations (3) and (4) to substitute for d1 and d2. Then, since u








1¡® ¡ 1): (14)
Using the de¯nition of £, we obtain the following expression for i
i =
(















The remainder of the analysis is similar.
2.3 Comparison with a planner's allocation
It is interesting to compare the equilibrium allocation with the allocation




qu(c1) + (1 ¡ q)u(c2)
subject to




13We implicitly assume that, at date 0, when households decide to become sophisticated
or not, they are able to commit to paying the resource cost when they receive d1 from the
bank.
13The planner's allocation, denoted fc¤
1;c¤
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1 ¡ (1 ¡ R
1¡®
® )(1 ¡ q)
; (18)
It is straightforward to see the equilibrium allocation of an economy with
i = 1 corresponds to the planner's allocation. This occurs if the cost of
becoming sophisticated is su±ciently high. In this static model, because
capital accumulation does not matter, the expected utility of households is
always (weakly) decreasing as the cost of becoming sophisticated decreases.
Hence, welfare is higher when banks are able to provide more risk-sharing
between patient and impatient depositors and the ¯nancial market is small.
We can summarize the results established in this section in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 In this economy:
1) The fraction of unsophisticated depositors increases as the cost of becom-
ing sophisticated increases
2) Investment in the long-term technology decreases and risk-sharing in-
creases as the fraction of unsophisticated depositors increase.
3) The planner's allocation is obtained when all households are unsophisti-
cated.
Allen and Gale (1997) study an environment in which the market con-
strains how much risk-sharing ¯nancial intermediaries can provide. In that
model, they show that having intermediaries and no ¯nancial markets is
preferable to a ¯nancial market and no intermediaries. As in our static
model, the intuition for their result is that more risk sharing is provided in
the former case than in the latter.
14A key feature of the model in Allen and Gale (1997) is that the productive
asset is in ¯xed supply. Hence it is di±cult to extend that environment to
include growth. In contrast, it is straightforward to adapt our setup to
a dynamic environment. The next section shows there is a real trade-o®
between risk-sharing and growth in a dynamic environment. Hence, the
result that bank-based ¯nancial systems are always better is overturned in
that context.
3 An OLG environment with growth
In this section, we embed the static model of the previous section in a two-
period OLG framework along the lines of Ennis and Keister (2003). This
allows us to think about how changes in the number of sophisticated house-
holds a®ect capital accumulation and growth.
For reasons described in the previous section, banks maximize the ex-
pected utility of their unsophisticated depositors. Hence we could either as-
sume that banks are long-lived institution or that a new set of banks emerges
with each new generation.14
At the beginning of each period a mass 1 of two-period lived households
is born. Households learn if they are patient or impatient at the end of the
¯rst period of their life. Their preferences are described by the same utility
function as in the previous section. Each household is endowed with 1 unit
of labor when young and nothing when old. Labor is supplied inelastically.
The timing of events is as follows. Each period is divided into two subpe-
riods: in the ¯rst subperiod (the beginning), production occurs according to
14As in Ennis and Keister (2003), but in contrast to Allen and Gale (1997) or Bhat-
tacharya and Padilla (1996), there is no intergenerational risk-sharing in this model.
15an endogenous growth production function, as described below, factors get
paid, and young households can deposit their wage income in one of a large
number of perfectly competitive banks. Banks can use deposits to purchase
existing capital from old households, to invest in new capital, or to invest
in storage. In the second subperiod (the end), depositors observe whether
they are patient or impatient and they can withdraw their deposits from the
bank. The details are presented below.
The beginning of period t: At the beginning of period t each old pa-
tient household owns Kt units of capital and young households are endowed
with Lt = 1 units of time. Competitive entrepreneurs combine the capital
and labor to produce a single consumption good Yt using the following pro-




µ, where ¹ Kt denotes the capital stock of
the economy at date t. The assumption of perfect competition in the factor
markets, and the fact that labor is supplied inelastically, implies the equilib-
rium real wage and real capital rental rate in units of the consumption good
are given by wt = (1 ¡ µ)Kt and rt = µ, respectively.
After the production takes place, old patient households consume an
amount equal to the earning from renting their capital and the net-of-depreciation
value of that capital. This corresponds to [rt+(1¡±)p
¡
t ]Kt units of consump-
tion good, where p
¡
t denotes the price of capital in units of the consumption
good in the beginning-of-period capital market. Note, in order for old patient
households to be willing to rent their capital to ¯rms before selling to the
banks, it must be that rt ¸ ±p
¡
t . We show below this condition always holds
under our parameter restrictions.
Each young household receives as wages wt units of consumption good.
These households deposit their wage income in a perfectly competitive bank
and enter a deposit contract (d1t;d2t) before they ¯nd out whether they are
16patient or impatient.15 The bank uses part of the deposits to purchase the
existing capital (1 ¡ ±)Kt, at the price p
¡
t , from old households and divides
the rest of the deposits between storage and investment in new capital. One
unit of consumption placed in storage at the beginning of period t yields
one unit of consumption at the end of the same period while one unit of
consumption invested in the productive technology at the beginning of period
t yields R > 1 units of capital at the beginning of period t + 1. Note, the
assumption that only banks engage in purchasing existing capital, investing
in new capital, and putting goods in storage at the beginning of the period
is innocuous. We impose parameter restrictions so the market for existing
capital always clears.
As in the static model, young households decide whether or not to become
sophisticated at the same time banks o®er the deposit contract (d1t;d2t).
Also, entrepreneurs who produce capital using the long-term technology must
be monitored if they are not to shirk. We maintain the assumptions of the
previous section concerning monitoring. In particular, a young household
that decides to become sophisticated must exert some e®ort and incur a cost
of (Â¡1) percent of lifetime utility, for some Â ¸ 1. We consider the case of
a proportional resource cost below.
The end of period t: Each young depositor realizes whether she is
patient or impatient. Impatient depositors only value consumption in this
subperiod when they are young while patient depositors only value consump-
tion in the ¯rst subperiod of t+1 when they become old. The nature of the
deposit contract is such that a depositor who claims to be impatient gets
paid d1t in this subperiod, while a depositor who claims to be patient will
get paid d2t in the ¯rst subperiod of t + 1. As will be shown, the deposit
15It can be shown that it is optimal for household to deposit all of their income in banks.
17contract o®ered by banks induces sophisticated patient depositors to misrep-
resent themselves as being impatient. Depositors can purchase capital from
the banks at a price p
+
t . As was the case in the static model, banks are un-
able to prevent patient sophisticated depositors from withdrawing because
being sophisticated is private information. Further, competition leads banks
to supply the ¯nancial claims needed to meet the demand from sophisticated
households.
Using an arbitrage argument similar to the one presented in footnote
9, it can be shown that the price of existing capital in the ¯rst subperiod
(primary) capital market under which the banks will be indi®erent between





Our parameter restrictions to be speci¯ed below will ensure that this is the
only equilibrium price for the existing capital in the primary market.
For convenience, we introduce the following notation:
X ´ R[rt + (1 ¡ ±)p
¡
t ] = R[µ + (1 ¡ ±)R
¡1] = Rµ + 1 ¡ ±: (20)
In words, X is the return on capital in each period. One unit of capital at
the beginning of a period can be rented to earn rt. The undepreciated capital
can then be sold to banks at the price p
¡
t . The proceeds from renting and
then selling the capital can then be invested in the long-term technology to
produce new capital next period. We choose our parameters such that X > 1
and °X < 1. Note, X > 1 implies rt ¸ ±p
¡
t , the condition for old households
to strictly prefer renting their capital to ¯rms before selling it to banks.
Given the availability of the storage technology, the equilibrium price of





18With this setup the optimal contract is essentially the same as in the
previous section with X replacing R in the expressions below. We have,
taking it as given, the following problem
max
d1t;d2t
[qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2t)]




maxf1;Xgd1t ¸ d2t (ICS)
maxf1;°Xgd1t · d2t (ICU)
The de¯nitions of £t and i also are very similar.
£t ´
·







®¡1 + (1 ¡ q)]
¡1: (23)
Solving the maximization problem subject to the (BC) only yields:
d1t =
X(1 ¡ µ)Kt




X ¡ (X ¡ £t)(1 ¡ q)it
: (25)
Taking the deposit contract as given, it is determined by
qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2t) = Â[qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d1tX)]: (26)





(1 ¡ q)X1¡® + q
: (27)
We consider Â 2 [1; ¹ Â], which guarantees the endogenously determined it 2
[i;1]. To see this, substituting (24) and (25) into (26) to obtain
it =
X
(1 ¡ q)X + qA
; (28)
19where A is given by
A ´
·





For the remainder of the paper we drop the indexes for it and £t since they
are time invariant.
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which each bank holds the same
portfolio. The law of motion for capital is given by










X ¡ (X ¡ £)i
X ¡ (X ¡ £)(1 ¡ q)i
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)Kt (30)
=
£ ¡ qX + qA
(1 ¡ q)£ + qA
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)Kt:
It can be veri¯ed that the growth rate of the capital stock, de¯ned by
½ =
£ ¡ qX + qA
(1 ¡ q)£ + qA
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ); (31)
is strictly decreasing in Â. Intuitively, a larger cost to becoming sophisticated
results in less sophisticated households participating in the capital market.
There is less investment in the productive technology and thus a smaller
growth rate.16 We can summarize this result in the following proposition.
16The growth rate is greater than or equal to 1 ¡ ± (implying that markets for existing
capital clear) for all Â 2 [1; ¹ Â] if and only if
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)
1 ¡ ±
¸ (1 ¡ q) + qX
®¡1
® : (32)
The necessary and su±cient condition for actual growth, that is, for the growth rate to be
greater than or equal to 1 (implying net investment is larger than or equal to replacement
capital), for all Â 2 [1; ¹ Â] is that
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ) ¸ (1 ¡ q) + qX
®¡1
® : (33)
20Proposition 2 Economies with a more market-oriented ¯nancial system
(economies with a small fraction of unsophisticated depositors) grow faster
than economies with a more bank-oriented ¯nancial system.
This result is consistent with the empirical evidence found by Ergungor
(2003) for countries with °exible legal systems. Our model is more likely to
apply to such countries since, in our model, banks do not have an advantage
over markets in enforcing contracts.17 Examples of countries with °exible
legal systems and market-oriented ¯nancial systems are the US and the UK.
Germany is a typical example of a country with a bank-oriented ¯nancial
system, but Germany does not have a °exible legal system. Examples of
countries with a °exible legal system and bank-oriented ¯nancial systems
comparable to Germany are Belgium, Finland, and Norway.
Our model also predicts that economies with a market-oriented ¯nan-
cial system o®er less risk-sharing than economies with a more bank-oriented
¯nancial system. While it is di±cult to measure directly the amount of risk-
sharing o®ered by various systems, one can think of indirect ways to evaluate
how much risk sharing is desired in a country. The tax system in the US
is usually believed to be relatively less redistributive than the tax system
in Norway. This might indicate a greater desire for risk-sharing in Norway
compared to the US, which would be consistent with our model.
3.1 Welfare analysis
While we have established that a market-oriented ¯nancial system promotes
growth in our model economy, there is no guarantee that such a system also
17This does not mean that the trade-o® we describe in the paper would not apply to
countries with in°exible legal systems. However, growth-enhancing activities on the asset-
side of banks could make the e®ect more di±cult to observe in the data in such countries.
21improves welfare. Indeed, the increase in growth comes at a cost in terms of
risk sharing. In this section we consider the mix of banks and markets which
provide the highest welfare.





t[qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2t)] (34)
plus the utility of the initial old households given by u([µ + R¡1(1 ¡ ±)]K0),









X ¡ (X ¡ £)(1 ¡ q)i
: (37)
The expression for G is very similar to the expression for d1t, with K0 tak-
ing the place of Kt. Hence, G is related to the amount of investment in
the storage technology. The direct e®ect of an increase in G is to increase
consumption, and thus welfare, but such an increase could reduce growth
and thus, indirectly, welfare. We call G the level e®ect. An increase in ½,
the growth e®ect, increases welfare directly. Clearly, £ corresponds to the
risk-sharing e®ect. An increase in the value of £ means a reduction in risk-
sharing. The direct e®ect of this is to reduce welfare since, from equation
(36), this reduces d2t. However, an increase in risk-sharing also has indirect
18Note that because of equation (26) the expected utility of sophisticated depositors is
the same, in equilibrium, to the expected utility of unsophisticated depositors. This is why
we can consider only the expected utility of unsophisticated depositors in our objective
function.
22e®ects on the repayments on deposits by a®ecting G and ½. From equation
(37) it is obvious that an increase in the risk-sharing improves the level of
repayments on deposits. At the same time it reduces the growth rate as
can be seen from equation (31). Note, these three e®ects, G, £, and ½, are
functions of deeper parameters that ultimately determine d1t and d2t.
It is easy to derive the following relations:
½
0(Â) < 0; £
0(Â) < 0; G
0(Â) > 0; i
0(Â) > 0: (38)
While a larger cost to becoming sophisticated{i.e., a larger Â{tends to reduce
both d1t and d2t through slowing growth, it tends to increase both d1t and d2t
through increasing G. There is thus a tradeo® between the level of consump-
tion households enjoy and the growth rate of the capital stock. An economy
can start with a high level of consumption and grow relatively slowly or,
instead, start at a lower level of consumption and grow faster. A larger cost
also leads to more risk-sharing and more liquidity-insurance and, thus, tends
to reduce d2t through decreasing £. In this dynamic environment, there is a
trade-o® between growth and risk-sharing. Increasing one must decrease the
other.
We are interested in the e®ect of a change in the cost Â on welfare and
the e®ects we just described imply that a change in Â may have con°icting
e®ect on social welfare. A given value for Â results in a given mix of markets
and banks and we are interested to know which Â corresponds to an optimal
structure in the sense that the resulting balance between growth and risk-
sharing maximizes the social welfare.




G1¡®[q + (1 ¡ q)£1¡®]
½®¡1 ¡ ¯
: (39)
As expected, welfare increases with G, the level e®ect, and with ½, the growth
23e®ect (recall ® > 1). An increase in £, corresponding to a decrease in risk-
sharing, a®ects welfare positively. To understand this seemingly counterin-
tuitive result it is important to remember that G and ½, are functions £. A
decrease in £ can be consistent with an increase in welfare due to the indirect
impact of £ on G and ½.
We want to ¯nd the value of Â that maximizes W. Such an optimum
exists since W is a continuous function on the compact domain of the cost.
It is also clear that such an \optimal" cost is a function of q;X;µ;±;®, and ¯,
but is independent of the initial capital K0. An immediate implication is that
everything else equal, a country's optimal bank-market mix is independent
of its initial wealth.19
Given the complexity of the expression for welfare, W, as a function of
Â{through equations (39) and the dependence of G, ½, £, and i on Â{it is
di±cult to obtain analytical results for the value of Â that maximizes this
expression. Therefore we look at some numerical simulations to get an idea
of the trade-o®s between risk-sharing and growth involved here in enhancing
welfare. We assume that a period in the model corresponds to approximately
30 years. Parameters for the production function are standard from the
macro literature: we choose µ = 0:33 and ± = 0:96. The latter corresponds
roughly to a 10 percent annual capital depreciation rate over 30 years. The
model imposes r = µ. We also choose R = 10, which corresponds to a value
of X = 3:34. This yields an annual return of capital of about 4.1 percent.
Note, the inequality rR > ± is satis¯ed as it needs to be. Our baseline for
preference parameters is ® = 3, q = 0:2, and ¯ = 0:55. We did extensive
19Although this result may seem counterintuitive, it should be kept in mind that, by
assumption, the development of the ¯nancial system is held equal in all comparisons. In
actual economies one might expect the development of a country's ¯nancial system to be
correlated with that county's wealth.
24robustness checks over the parameter space and ¯nd that our results are not
sensitive to our choice of parameters.20
Our ¯rst numerical exercise concerns the e®ect of risk-sharing on the
optimal trade-o® between ¯nancial intermediaries and the market. We use
the baseline parameters for all variables except for the coe±cient ® which
we let vary. In each ¯gure, we provide two graphs. The top graph shows
the evolution of £, G, and ½ for di®erent values of i. Here, i is determined
endogenously as Â varies between 1 and ¹ Â.21 The bottom graph shows the
evolution of welfare for di®erent values of i.
As can be seen in Figures 1, 2, and 3, the maximum amount of welfare
is reached for a higher level of the cost Â as the value of ® increases. When
the coe±cient of risk aversion is low (® = 2), as in Figure 1, welfare is
maximized when the cost of becoming sophisticated is zero and banks o®er
no risk-sharing. For a higher coe±cient or risk aversion (® = 3), as in Figure
2, the optimal cost Â belongs to the interval (1; ¹ Â). It is optimal for banks to
o®er some risk-sharing, but less than in the static case. Finally, for an even
higher coe±cient of risk aversion (® = 5), as in Figure 3, the optimal cost is
high enough that no household becomes sophisticated. In this case banks are
not constrained in the amount of risk-sharing they can provide but growth
is slow.
The graphs representing £, G, and ½ are very similar in each case. As
expected, the growth e®ect decreases with i as there is less investment in the
productive technology. An increase in i also means a decrease in £ which
corresponds to an increase in risk-sharing as the di®erence between d1t and
d2t decreases. Finally, an increase in i is accompanied by an increase in the
20We use Matlab to compute the numerical solutions to the model. The code is available
from the authors upon request.
21There is a bijective mapping between Â and i.
25level e®ect G.






































































































































































































f i (corresponding to small values of Â), is in the risk-sharing
e®ect. The increase in the amount of risk-sharing provided by banks, as i
increases from low values, is much faster in Figure 1 than in Figure 2 and in
Figure 2 than in Figure 3. Comparing the same Figures, the main di®erences
for large values of i (corresponding to large values of Â) are in the growth
and the level e®ect.



























Figure 2. The case with a utility cost
This helps explain the shape of welfare as a function of i. For low val-
ues of i, an increase in the coe±cient of risk aversion increases the e®ect on
risk-sharing. This means that the e®ect on welfare from an increase in Â
gradually changes from being negative to becoming positive. The main driv-
ing force of the changes for higher values of i is the changes in the growth
and the level e®ect. These go in opposite direction and it is hard to see from
the graphs that the growth e®ect becomes relatively less important as the
coe±cient of risk aversion increases. Nevertheless, for a high enough value of
this coe±cient, welfare is maximized if no household becomes sophisticated.



























Figure 3. The case with a utility cost
To summarize the results from our numerical exercises, we can say that
if two economies A and B are populated by households who have coe±cients
of risk aversion ®A and ®B, respectively, where ®A > ®B, then households in
economy A prefer a more bank oriented system than households in economy
B. As a consequence, economy A will have a lower level of capital than econ-
omy B. When ® is su±ciently small, the optimal system is such that banks
provide no risk-sharing. Intuitively, if consumers are not very risk-averse
they do not value risk-sharing very much and an increase in risk-sharing can-
not compensate for a decrease in the level of consumption that accompanies
28a reduction of the capital stock. Conversely, if households are su±ciently
risk-averse the optimal system is such that banks are not constrained in the
amount of risk-sharing they provide.
In the appendix we report the result of another experiment where we
change the value of q, keeping all other parameters as in our baseline case.
Figures 7, shows that if q is su±ciently small (q = 0:1), welfare is maximized
in a bank-only system. As q increases, as in Figure 2 (q = 0:2), the maximum
welfare is reached with a mix of banks and market, where banks play a smaller
role. For higher values of q (q = 0:3), as in Figure 8, a market-only system
maximizes welfare. This result might be due to the fact that when q is small
banks provide little risk-sharing but growth is faster. Constraining banks
thus provides little additional bene¯t. When q is larger the bene¯t from
constraining banks increases.
We also did some experiments changing ¯ while keeping other parameters
constant. Perhaps surprisingly, changes in ¯ have very little e®ect on the
value of Â that maximizes social welfare. One might have thought that there
would be an important trade-o® between early and late generations. Indeed,
the bene¯ts from additional growth should be felt disproportionately by late
generations. A change in ¯, by modifying the relative weight put on early
and late generations can give a sense of the importance of that trade-o®. Our
results suggests it is of second-order importance. We do not report graphs
for this experiment.
In another exercise, we change the value of R (which in turns modi¯es
X). Here we hope to capture the idea that developing countries, because
they have a low stock of capital, might o®er a higher return on capital than
more developed countries. Figure 9, in the appendix, shows that if R is
su±ciently large, corresponding to a developing country, banks should not
29be constrained by markets very much. For lower values of R, as in Figure
2, the role of markets increases. As R is decreased further, as in Figure 10,
it becomes optimal for banks to provide no risk-sharing. The intuition is
that as R decreases, the income e®ect dominates the substitution e®ect and
households want less risk-sharing.
These results are consistent with the notion that developing countries
(with low capital stocks and high return on capital) should have a more
bank-oriented system than more developed countries in which capital is more
abundant. In the development process, as capital accumulates and the return
decreases, the ¯nancial system becomes more and more market-oriented. The
usual arguments given to explain this evolution depend on informational
asymmetries and the high ¯xed cost of setting up well-functioning markets.22
Here we propose a di®erent way to think about this evolution which depends
on the endogenous trade-o® between growth and risk-sharing.
3.2 The resource-cost case
We now consider the case of a resource cost. All relations up to (25) hold as
before. Taking the deposit contract as given, the equation for determining it
is now given by
qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2t) = qu(Cd1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(Cd1tR): (40)














22See, for example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) or Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2001).
30We consider C 2 [C;1], which guarantees the endogenously determined it 2
[i;1]. To see this, substitute (24) and (25) into (40) to obtain
it =
R
(1 ¡ q)R + qB
; (42)
which is constant over time, where
B ´
·





It can then be veri¯ed that as C varies from 1 to C, it varies from i to 1. Note
that since the corresponding £t > 1 and °R < 1, the solution in (24) and
(25) satis¯es (ICU). The solution also satis¯es (ICS) since R ¸ £t. Note
also that since it · 1, we have £t ¸ R1=®. We again drop the indexes for it
and £t since they are time independent.
Since B is increasing in C, i is decreasing in the cost of becoming sophis-
ticated. In words, the smaller C, the larger the fraction of households who
choose to become sophisticated.
The analysis so far is homomorphic to the case with a utility cost, with
the underlying linkage C1¡® = Â. The implication for capital accumulation
is, however, slightly di®erent here. We shall again focus on a symmetric
equilibrium in which each bank holds the same portfolio. The law of motion
for capital is now given by










CR ¡ (CR ¡ £)i
R ¡ (R ¡ £)(1 ¡ q)i
X(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)Kt (44)
=
£ ¡ qCR + qCB
(1 ¡ q)£ + qB
X(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)Kt:
Note, unlike in the case with a utility cost there are here two opposite e®ects
of a resource cost on the growth rate. The smaller the cost of becoming
31sophisticated, the more households want to become sophisticated. This tends
to help investment and growth on the one hand. On the other hand, as more
households become sophisticated, they use resources to pay the cost. It can
be shown that the positive e®ect always dominates the negative e®ect. In
consequence, the growth rate, de¯ned by
½ =
£ ¡ qCR + qCB
(1 ¡ q)£ + qB
X(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ); (45)
is strictly increasing in C. It is then easy to show the growth rate is greater
than or equal to 1 ¡ ± for all C 2 [C;1] if and only if (32) holds, and it is
greater than or equal to 1 for all C 2 [C;1] if and only if (33) holds.
Thus, regardless of how the cost is modeled, a general lesson is that
a smaller cost leads to more sophisticated households and a more market-
oriented economy. While this results in less risk-sharing and less liquidity
insurance, it promotes more economic growth. What mix of banks and mar-
kets is optimal depends on what mix of growth and risk-sharing is optimal
from a welfare point of view. We turn now to examining this issue.
The expression for welfare in this case is similar to the utility-cost case.
It is easy to derive the following relations.
½
0(C) > 0; £
0(C) > 0; G
0(C) < 0; i
0(C) < 0: (46)
We run a similar set of numerical experiments for the resource-cost case
as we did for the utility-cost case. We keep the same parameters for our
baseline experiments. Figures 4, 5, and 6, graph welfare, as well as the three
e®ects that determine it, for di®erent values of the risk-aversion coe±cient (in
these graphs, ® = 2;3; and 5, respectively). The graphs con¯rm the general
story told in the utility-cost case. When risk-aversion increases , there is a
shift from a market-oriented to a bank-oriented system. Interestingly, with a
resource cost we are unable to ¯nd cases where the optimal cost corresponds
32to i 2 (i;1). In words, welfare is maximized either when banks provide no
risk-sharing or when they are unconstrained in how much risk-sharing they
can provide.





































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. The case with a resource cost
Figures 11 and 12, in the appendix, show welfare for di®erent values of q,
the fraction of impatient depositors in the economy. As was the case for the
utility cost, an increase in q leads to a shift from a market-dominated system
to a bank-dominated system in the resource-cost case. The intuition for this
result is the same for both type of costs. Finally, we considered di®erent
values of ¯. Again, changes in the value of ¯ have very little impact on the
value of C that maximizes social welfare. We do not report graphs for this
case.



























Figure 6. The case with a resource cost
Figures 13 and 14, also in the appendix, show welfare for di®erent values
of R (and thus, implicitly, X). As in the utility-cost case, an decrease in
R increases the welfare associated with a market-dominated system and in-
creases the welfare associated with a bank-oriented system. Consistent with
our other results concerning the resource-cost case, the optimal mix switches
from one extreme to the other rather than evolving gradually.
Figure 5 suggests that an exogenous decrease in C could hurt countries
with bank-oriented systems more if the decrease is small than if it is large
enough to lead to a complete change of system towards markets.
354 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature comparing the relative performance
of ¯nancial intermediaries and markets by studying an environment in which
a trade-o® between risk-sharing and growth arises endogenously. Our model
is consistent with recent evidence suggesting that, in countries with °exible
legal systems, market-oriented ¯nancial systems promote growth compared
to more bank-oriented systems. We consider a model in which ¯nancial in-
termediaries provide insurance to households against a liquidity shock, as in
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Households can also invest directly on a ¯nan-
cial market, if they pay a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of intermediaries
to provide risk-sharing is constrained by the market: The more households
invest directly in the market, the less risk-sharing intermediaries can pro-
vide. On the other hand, overall investment in the productive technology
is reduced when the available degree of risk-sharing in the economy is in-
creasing. This creates a trade-o® between risk-sharing and growth: While
economies that are more market-oriented always enjoy higher growth, coun-
tries with more bank-dominated ¯nancial systems provide households with
more e±cient risk-sharing.
Regarding the welfare implications of this trade-o® our numerical exam-
ples show that even though more market-oriented ¯nancial systems promote
growth they do not necessarily increase social welfare. We derive the opti-
mal balance between intermediaries and markets (or, equivalently, between
risk-sharing and growth) in di®erent economies. We ¯nd that, everything
else being equal, economies in which households are more risk-averse should
be more bank-oriented. The intuition is that if households care less about
risk, they value the increase in the growth rate of the economy more than
the loss in risk-sharing. These results are robust to changes in the values of
36parameters in our numerical simulations.
If a benevolent government can in°uence the cost of having access to mar-
ket, then the policy implication of our model is clear. The government should
in°uence the ¯nancial structure in order to have an optimal level of bank-
dominance. The government could a®ect the ¯nancial system by modifying
the costs of investing directly in the ¯nancial market. For example, the cost
of investing in the market could be lowered by introducing more transparent
accounting standards or implementing corporate governance codes that pro-
vide better investor protection. This way the government would reduce the
e®ort required from investors to e±ciently select and monitor their invest-
ments. Similarly, the costs of access to market could be increased by imposing
restrictions on who is allowed to buy and trade ¯nancial claims. How bank-
oriented a particular ¯nancial system should be depends on the economy's
deep parameters. In some economies, particularly less developed countries
with a high marginal return on capital, it might be bene¯cial to make direct
¯nancial market access rather costly. In such countries a bank-dominated
¯nancial system could increase overall welfare even though it might limit
growth.
It is not clear, however, that governments can directly in°uence the gen-
eral structure of the ¯nancial system very much. Given the various elements
that constitute the di®erent types of ¯nancial systems the governmental im-
pact on the degree of the bank-dominance may be rather limited.23 Other
factors such as the international integration of ¯nancial markets could be
important. In the case of bank-oriented countries, the international integra-
tion of ¯nancial markets has made access to ¯nancial markets for households
easier. This evolution might have been welfare reducing if the initial degree
23See Allen Gale (2000).
37of bank-dominance in these economies was optimal before the international
integration of ¯nancial markets.
In Europe, for example, the integration of ¯nancial markets has changed
the ¯nancial landscape entirely. Whereas in the early eighties ¯nancial sys-
tems were very di®erent across European countries, national particularities
are vanishing. They are being replaced by a more and more integrated con-
tinental European ¯nancial system, especially in the Euroarea. If these
economies and their ¯nancial systems are not too di®erent this might not
a®ect overall welfare very much.24
However, in the case of the ¯nancial integration of the UK and continental
Europe, the conclusion might be very di®erent. Even though the economies
are probably rather similar (in terms of the deep parameters) their ¯nancial
systems are generally seen as the two opposite extremes. As Figure 5 sug-
gests, this might be optimal for otherwise similar countries. But our model
also suggests that ¯nancial integration between these economies could lead to
an intermediate type of ¯nancial system making both countries worse o®. An
integrated ¯nancial system could accelerate growth in a country like Belgium
beyond its optimal level while reducing growth in the UK. Hence, ¯nancial
integration might reduce the overall welfare of households in both countries.
24This seems to be the case for most of the countries having introduced the Euro so far.
See, for instance, ECB (2002) Report on ¯nancial structure.
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Figure 7. The case with a utility cost



























Figure 8. The case with a utility cost




























Figure 9. The case with a utility cost

























Figure 10. The case with a utility cost



























Figure 11. The case with a resource cost


























Figure 12. The case with a resource cost

























Figure 13. The case with a resource cost


























Figure 14. The case with a resource cost
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